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Two reasoning biases, jumping to conclusions (JTC) and belief inflexibility, have been found to be
associated with delusions. We examined these biases and their relationship with delusional conviction in
a longitudinal cohort of people with schizophrenia-spectrum psychosis. We hypothesized that JTC, lack
of belief flexibility, and delusional conviction would form distinct factors, and that JTC and lack of belief
flexibility would predict less change in delusional conviction over time. Two hundred seventy-three
patients with delusions were assessed over twelve months of a treatment trial (Garety et al., 2008).
Forty-one percent of the sample had 100% conviction in their delusions, 50% showed a JTC bias, and
50%–75% showed a lack of belief flexibility. Delusional conviction, JTC, and belief flexibility formed
distinct factors although conviction was negatively correlated with belief flexibility. Conviction declined
slightly over the year in this established psychosis group, whereas the reasoning biases were stable. There
was little evidence that reasoning predicted the slight decline in conviction. The degree to which people
believe their delusions, their ability to think that they may be mistaken and to consider alternative
explanations, and their hastiness in decision making are three distinct processes although belief flexibility
and conviction are related. In this established psychosis sample, reasoning biases changed little in
response to medication or psychological therapy. Required now is examination of these processes in
psychosis groups where there is greater change in delusion conviction, as well as tests of the effects on
delusions when these reasoning biases are specifically targeted.
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The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition, (Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association, 2000) defines delusion as “A false
belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is
firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and
despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or
evidence to the contrary” (p. 765). Thus, a delusional belief is
incorrect; it is based on erroneous judgments about the world, and
it is unresponsive to countervailing evidence. Biases of reasoning
have been invoked to understand the process of delusion forma-
tion, and limited data-gathering (jumping to conclusions; JTC) and
a failure to think of alternative accounts to the delusion (a lack of
belief flexibility) have previously been shown to be related to how
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http://www.apa.org/about/copyright.html.strongly a delusion is held (delusional conviction; e.g., Freeman et
al., 2004; Garety et al., 2005). In this study, the single largest study
of its type, we wanted to (a) examine the prevalence of the
reasoning biases JTC and lack of belief flexibility in individuals
with delusions; (b) evaluate the structure of delusional conviction,
JTC, and belief flexibility and whether they are distinct processes;
and (c) assess whether delusional conviction would vary in re-
sponse to levels of JTC bias and belief flexibility.
Reasoning Processes Associated With Delusions
The most replicated reasoning bias in delusion research is JTC,
a tendency to gather less data than controls to reach a decision
(reviewed by Fine et al., 2007; Garety & Freeman, 1999; Freeman,
2007). Limited decision-making encourages the rapid acceptance
of erroneous beliefs. Research published so far has involved rel-
atively small numbers of participants, with JTC being apparent in
between one third and two thirds of individuals with delusions
(e.g., Garety, Hemley, & Wessely, 1991, 2005; Moritz & Wood-
ward, 2005; Startup, Freeman, & Garety, 2008; van Dael et al.,
2006). It has also been reported in people “at risk” for psychosis
(Broome et al., 2007), and, to an attenuated degree, in the relatives
of people with psychosis and in people scoring highly on delu-
sional ideation scales (e.g., Colbert & Peters, 2002; Freeman,
Pugh, & Garety, 2008; van Dael et al., 2006; Warman & Martin,
2006). In cross-sectional studies, it is greatest in patients with
current delusions (e.g., Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl, & Rief, 2010; van
Dael et al., 2006). There have been few longitudinal investigations
of JTC: In a systematic review (So, Garety, Peters, & Kapur,
2010), three such studies are reported (Peters & Garety, 2006;
Menon, Mizrahi, & Kapur, 2008 and Woodward, Munz, LeClerc,
& Lecomte, 2009). The available data show that JTC does not
improve consistently over time or with symptom improvement, but
there is some evidence that baseline JTC predicts outcome. For
example, JTC was shown to moderate the response to antipsy-
chotic treatments in a drug-naı ¨ve group of patients with a first
episode of psychosis: Those with an extreme JTC bias showed a
poorer treatment response (Menon et al., 2008). Taken as a whole,
the evidence suggests that it is likely that JTC is a relatively stable
trait increasing susceptibility to the development of delusions, and
it may predict change over time.
Belief flexibility in psychosis refers to “a metacognitive process
about thinking about one’s own delusional beliefs, changing them
in the light of reflection and evidence and generating and consid-
ering alternatives” (Garety et al., 2005, p. 374). It has been
assessed with the Possibility of Being Mistaken (PM) and Reaction
to Hypothetical Contradiction (RTHC) items of the Maudsley
Assessment of Delusions Schedule (MADS; Wessely et al., 1993).
These items assess, in the context of an interview about delusional
beliefs, whether the individual can consider it “at all possible” that
they might be mistaken in their belief, however unlikely, and also
to consider a hypothetical but plausible piece of evidence that
might counteract their belief. We have since developed a further
item which we also consider to tap belief flexibility, in the Expla-
nation of Experiences assessment (Freeman et al., 2004). In this,
persons with delusions are asked if they can think of any possible
alternative explanation (AE) for the evidence they cite in support
of their delusion, other than the delusional explanation. Contrary to
the traditional view of delusions as fixed and unresponsive to
countervailing evidence, approximately one quarter to one half of
individuals with delusions demonstrate belief flexibility on any
one of these assessments (e.g., Freeman et al., 2004; Colbert,
Peters, & Garety, 2010; Buchanan et al., 1993). For example,
Garety et al. (2005) found that half of those with delusions ac-
knowledged that there was a possibility that they were mistaken,
while Freeman et al. (2004) reported that a quarter of individuals
with delusions could generate alternative explanations for their
experiences even if they did not agree with them. There have been
no longitudinal studies of belief flexibility measured in this way
although, in one study, we found evidence of improvement over
time in evidence evaluation, suggesting that belief flexibility may
change as delusions remit (So et al., 2010). There is also some
evidence that it might predict change. Flexibility, as assessed by
the PM item, predicted successful response to psychological ther-
apy for psychosis in a randomized, controlled trial (Garety et al.,
1997). We, therefore, hypothesized that change in delusions may
be facilitated by a willingness to consider that a delusion may be
mistaken and that alternative explanations might be possible. It has
further been argued that JTC influences delusional conviction via
a lack of belief flexibility (Garety et al., 2005). Limited data-
gathering (JTC) may preclude the consideration of alternative
explanations (belief flexibility), and therefore, strengthen belief in
a delusional account. In our cognitive model of psychosis, we
propose that, in common with cognitive models for other disor-
ders, appraisals are key to the development and persistence of
psychosis. We argue that reasoning biases, such as JTC and a lack
of belief flexibility, are important in that they may influence the
appraisal of anomalous experiences, adverse events, and distress-
ing emotions (by limited data gathering or generation of alterna-
tives), and thus, contribute to symptom formation and maintenance
(Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001; Garety,
Bebbington, Fowler, Freeman, & Kuipers, 2007).
The Measurement of Delusion Conviction and
Reasoning Processes
Both limited data-gathering and less belief flexibility have been
shown to be associated with stronger delusional conviction (e.g.,
Colbert et al., 2010; Freeman et al., 2004, 2008; Garety et al.,
2005). However, this raises the issue of whether these concepts are
truly distinguishable from delusional conviction. This is especially
so for the concept of belief flexibility, where people need to
acknowledge that they could be mistaken about their delusional
belief, even if they think this is highly unlikely. In other words, is
belief flexibility simply an indirect measure of delusional convic-
tion? To our knowledge, only one study has formally examined
belief flexibility in people with delusions by using nondelusional,
neutral material—in this case, the belief that “the sun will rise
tomorrow, that is, that there will be another day tomorrow” (Col-
bert et al., 2010). In this study, delusional participants showed less
willingness than a nonclinical control group to consider that they
might be mistaken on this standard “neutral” belief, suggesting that
a lack of belief flexibility may be characteristic of the reasoning
style of people with delusions rather than being restricted to and
confounded by their conviction in their delusional beliefs. How-
ever, further examination of this is clearly warranted.
The measurement of these concepts is, therefore, key to further
investigation. A variety of measures have been used to assess
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atric assessments—the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale
(PANSS) (Kay et al., 1987) and the Scale for the Assessment of
Positive Symptoms (SAPS) (Andreasen, 1984)—have typically
been used to assess delusions, with conviction as an important
scoring criterion. Conviction has been measured using multidi-
mensional scales, including the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales
(PSYRATS) (Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier, & Faragher, 1999), the
MADS (Wessely et al., 1993), and the Explanations of Experi-
ences interview (EoE) (Freeman et al., 2004). Most studies of
delusional conviction have used single measures. While these
measures are likely to be highly correlated, we do not know how
effectively they capture the degree of belief conviction. A similar
situation applies to the measurement of reasoning biases. The
probabilistic reasoning task used to assess JTC has easy and
difficult versions, and the content of the task also varies (e.g.,
Dudley, John, Young, & Over, 1997a). Belief flexibility has been
measured variously with assessment of the possibility of being
mistaken (PM) (Wessely et al., 1993), the reaction to hypothetical
contradiction (RTHC: Wessely et al., 1993), and the generation of
alternative explanations (AE: Freeman et al., 2004). There has
been no formal investigation of whether these represent aspects of
a common reasoning bias or of how they are related to JTC.
The Current Study
Multivariate approaches, such as structural equation modeling
and factor analysis, allow exploitation of the richness of multiple
measurements and direct investigation of the relationships between
latent constructs, controlling for the effects of measurement error
in the observed responses (Bentler, 1980). Our current understand-
ing of delusional conviction and reasoning biases in psychosis
clearly lends itself to the establishment of latent factors drawn
from different instruments relating to similar constructs. For ex-
ample, Bentall et al. (2009) recently used structural equation
models with latent variables to determine the structure of relation-
ships among psychological mechanisms potentially contributing to
paranoia which found that both cognitive (including JTC) and
emotion-related processes were related to paranoia. In the present
study, we analyzed data from the Psychological Prevention of
Relapse in Psychosis Trial (Garety et al., 2008), in which patients
with a recent relapse of psychosis were assessed at different time
points, on multiple measures of delusional conviction, JTC and
belief flexibility. Two earlier cross-sectional studies (Freeman et
al., 2004; Garety et al., 2005) drew from the first 100 participants
in this trial. As discussed in those two studies, it was our a priori
plan to replicate the cross-sectional findings in the larger sample
reported here and to examine changes over time. In the current
study, we aimed first to examine the prevalence of JTC and of a
lack of belief flexibility in this group of currently deluded patients
following a recent relapse, and then to test hypotheses about their
relationships with each other and with delusional conviction over
time.
The three hypotheses derived from our review of the literature
were as follows:
1. Delusional conviction, JTC, and belief flexibility are
distinct but interrelated processes.
2. Conviction and a lack of belief flexibility will decline
over time, whereas JTC is relatively stable.
3. Baseline JTC and lack of belief flexibility will predict
persistence of delusional conviction over time.
Method
Participants
Participants were 301 patients from the Psychological Preven-
tion of Relapse in Psychosis (PRP) Trial (ISRCTN83557988).
Participants were recruited by approaching consecutive patients
who had recently relapsed, whether or not they had been admitted.
Two hundred seventy-three of the participants had presentations
that included delusions; 28 had hallucinations but no delusions.
The PRP Trial was a multicenter randomized controlled trial of
cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) and family intervention for
psychosis that took place in the United Kingdom (Garety et al.,
2008). It was designed to answer questions both about outcome
and the psychological processes associated with psychosis over
time. Inclusion criteria for the PRP Trial were the following: a
current diagnosis of nonaffective psychosis (schizophrenia, schizo-
affective psychosis, delusional disorder), age between 18 and 65
years, a second or subsequent episode starting not more than 3
months before consent to enter the trial, and a rating of at least 4
(moderate severity) on the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale
(PANSS) (Kay et al., 1987) on at least one positive psychotic
symptom at the time of the first meeting. Exclusion criteria were
a primary diagnosis of alcohol or substance dependency, organic
syndrome or learning disability, an inadequate command of Eng-
lish, and unstable residential arrangements. Patients were random-
ized into the following conditions: treatment as usual, treatment as
usual plus CBT, and treatment as usual plus family intervention. In
this treatment trial, in which CBT and family intervention were
investigated and compared with treatment as usual, there were no
significant treatment effects on delusional outcomes or other psy-
chotic symptoms, or on JTC and belief flexibility: only depression
improved in response to CBT (Garety et al., 2008). The whole
sample was, therefore, grouped together in the current study. This
report uses symptom and psychological assessments carried out at
baseline, 3 months, and 12 months.
Measures
General psychopathology and delusions. Several clinical
rating scales were used as measures of psychopathology. The
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) (Kay et al., 1987)
is a 30-item rating scale developed for assessing phenomena
associated with schizophrenia. Symptoms are rated over the past
week. The Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS)
(Andreasen, 1984) is a 35-item rating instrument. Symptoms are
rated over the past month. The Psychotic Symptom Rating Scale
(PSYRATS) (Haddock et al., 1999) is a 17-item scale measuring
multiple dimensions of auditory hallucinations and delusions.
Symptoms are rated over the past week. Good psychometric prop-
erties have been reported for PANSS (e.g., Kay, 1990), SAPS
(Andreasen, 1984; Kay, 1990), and PSYRATS (Haddock et al.,
1999). Four scale items were selected to derive the delusional
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delusion item, the PSYRATS delusional conviction item, and the
conviction score (0–100%) on the EoE (Freeman et al., 2004).
Jumping to conclusions (JTC). In this study, three versions
of the beads task were used. In the first version, individuals are
presented with two jars, each containing 100 colored beads. One of
the jars contains 85 beads of color A and 15 beads of color B,
while the other jar contains 85 beads of color B and 15 beads of
color A. Participants are told that the jars will be hidden from view
and then beads will be drawn, one at a time, from just one of the
jars, and will be replaced in the same jar, so that the proportions
remain the same. They can see as many beads as they like before
deciding which of the jars the beads are drawn from. The current
study also included a more difficult version with beads in the ratio
60:40 (Dudley, John, Young, & Over, 1997b), and a version using
salient words (positive and negative) in the ratio 60:40 (Dudley et
al., 1997a). In the salient version of the task, the beads are replaced
by words ostensibly generated by a survey of the opinions of two
groups of 100 about an individual. Participants are told that one
group makes 60 positive comments and 40 negative comments,
while the reverse is true for the other group. They have to decide
which survey the words have been selected from. The variable is
the number of pieces of information the participant selects before
making a decision. In order to identify people with an extreme
reasoning bias, the JTC bias has been defined as making a decision
with two pieces of information or fewer (Garety et al., 2005). We
have previously adopted this categorical (dichotomous) method of
assessing JTC (Garety et al., 2005) since, first, evidence suggests
that it is the extreme bias, of gathering very limited data, which
particularly characterizes people with delusions (Garety et al.,
1991) and, second, the alternative method employed by research-
ers, the number of draws to decision, is not a normally distributed
continuous scale since the information value of each additional
bead varies according to the color of the bead presented and the
sequence employed. However, we explored the use of both scoring
methods in our factor analyses (see below).
Belief flexibility. The Maudsley Assessment of Delusions
Scale (MADS; Wessely et al., 1993) is a standardized interview
that assesses eight dimensions of delusional experience. The belief
maintenance section of the MADS inquires about the evidence for
the delusion, and two of its items have been used to measure
aspects of belief flexibility (the possibility of being mistaken, PM,
and the reaction to hypothetical contradiction, RTHC). The evi-
dence for the delusion cited by participants is sensitively dis-
cussed, and they are asked whether it is at all possible for them to
be mistaken about their delusional belief. The interviewer then
asks how they would react in a hypothetical situation if some new
evidence were to be generated which contradicts the delusion. If
they report that this would alter in any way their level of belief, this
is recorded as belief flexibility, each item dichotomously scored
(yes/no). The scale has very good interrater reliability (Wessely et
al., 1993), and kappas for these two items are reported as excellent
(PM kappa  0.91 and RTHC kappa  0.90).
The EoE (Freeman et al., 2004) is a structured interview de-
signed to assess whether people can envisage alternative explana-
tions for the evidence cited for their delusion. Once the evidence
for the delusion is established, they are asked, “Can you think of
any other explanations for the experiences that you have de-
scribed? Are there any other reasons—other than [the delusional
belief]—that could possibly account for these experiences even if
you think they are very unlikely?” The generation of any alterna-
tive explanation (scored yes/no) is taken as a measure of belief
flexibility. The current strength of the delusional explanation is
rated on a conviction rating scale, “How strongly do you believe
X?” (0–100%), which forms one of the conviction measures in the
current study. Since this item is so similar to the MADS item,
“How sure are you about X?” the MADS conviction item was not
included in the assessment battery.
Interrater Reliability of Clinical Assessments
All assessments were conducted by research workers after con-
sent had been obtained. Interviews were tape-recorded for reliabil-
ity and quality control purposes. Research workers met regularly
with a supervisor throughout the study to maintain reliability of
procedures and ratings. Reliability of clinical interview ratings was
assessed using the PANSS positive symptom score. At least one
other assessor (selected from a panel of 15 raters—excluding the
rater responsible for the initial assessment) rerated 55 assessments.
The number of reratings varied between 1 and 6, and the total
number of ratings made by the 15 raters varied between 2 and 27.
A linear one-way random effects model (with participant identifi-
cation as the explanatory factor) was fitted by restricted maximum
likelihood using Stata’s xtreg procedure (version 8 for Windows)
and yielded an intraclass correlation of 0.88 (95% CI 0.82–0.92).
This indicates very acceptable interrater reliability. We also
checked the reliability of ratings of the PSYRATS. The PSYRATS
conviction rating simply requires the assessor to categorize the
patient’s percentage response into one of five ordinal categories
defined by percentage numbers. There is no clinical judgment
required, and interrater variability would not be expected. In the
development of the scale, six assessors each rerated six interviews
and there was perfect reliability for the delusion conviction item
(Haddock et al., 1999). In the current study, seven PSYRATS
interviews were rerated, and again there was perfect reliability.
Statistical Analysis
First, descriptive reports of the frequency of individual measures
of reasoning biases (JTC and belief flexibility) and of levels of
conviction, and their associations with each other, were generated
with SPSS 15.0 for Windows (SPSS, 2006).
For the first hypothesis, that conviction, JTC and belief flexi-
bility are distinct but interrelated processes, both exploratory and
confirmatory factor analyses were conducted using Mplus 5.2
(Muthe ´n & Muthe ´n, 2007) to identify and confirm the structure of
conviction and reasoning biases. In order to establish the factor
structure of conviction, JTC, and belief flexibility, baseline mea-
sures of these variables were entered into an exploratory factor
analysis (using data only from the 273 patients with delusions).
The measures (“items”) entered into the factor analysis were
specified in Mplus as being either quantitative (the default) or
categorical. For conviction, the following quantitative measures
were used: PANSS delusion item (range 1–7), SAPS global delu-
sion item (range 0–5), PSYRATS conviction item (range 0–4),
and conviction score on the EoE interview (range 0–100). The
categorical (dichotomous) JTC measures were presence/absence of
JTC bias on the 3 versions of the beads task, and the continuous
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words drawn. For belief flexibility, binary (positive/negative) re-
sponses to the “possibility of being mistaken” and “reaction to
hypothetical contradiction” items in the MADS interview and the
“generation of alternative explanations” item in the EoE interview
were entered. A higher JTC factor score indicated a more limited
data-gathering style, whereas a high belief flexiblity factor score
meant greater belief flexibility. In exploratory factor analysis, all
loadings were freely estimated, but the variances of each of the
factors were constrained to be 1.
To test the second hypothesis, concerning change over time, for
each of the constructs (conviction, JTC, and belief flexilibity), a
longitudinal (repeated measures) factor analysis model was sepa-
rately fitted. At each of the three time points, we specified the
same underlying factor. For each time point, the loading for the
first variable entered into the model was set to 1 (to determine
the scale). The loadings of each of the other variables (items)
were freely estimated but were constrained to be the same
across time points (after first establishing that these constraints
did not lead to any significant loss of fit). No constraints were
imposed on any of the residual (error) variances. Temporal
trends in the factor scores were estimated and tested using two
orthogonal contrasts created by the “model constraint” option in
Mplus—(a) C1: the difference between 3 and 12 month scores,
and (b) C2: the difference between the baseline score and the
average of the 3 and 12 months scores. An equivalent (global)
test of trends was generated by constraining the factor scores to
be equal for the three time points and comparing the chi-squares
for the constrained and unconstrained models.
The third and final hypothesis was that change in conviction is
predicted by JTC and belief flexbility. The same estimated factor
scores were correlated with change scores for delusional convic-
tion.
As in most longitudinal studies, there were missing data in
this sample. The sample size available for each variable at each
time point is specified in Table 1 (for the delusion conviction
variables) and the results section (for reasoning variables);
descriptive statistics based on these sample sizes are reported.
The exploratory factor model was estimated using all available
data on the component variables at baseline. The percentages of
missing values in the sample (N  273) on the key variables at
baseline are as follows: 0% (PANSS delusion score), 0% (SAPS
global delusion score), 1.8% (PSYRATS conviction), 25.3%
(EoE conviction), 31.5% (85:15 beads task), 32.6% (60:40
beads task), 34.8% (words task), 20.9% (possibility of being
mistaken), 24.9% (reaction to hypothetical contradiction),
24.9% (alternative explanations). Mplus uses maximum likeli-
hood (ML) estimator for continuous variables (e.g., conviction
measures) and WLSMV estimator (weighted least-squares with
mean and variance adjustment) for categorical variables (i.e.,
JTC and belief flexibility measures). ML imputes the model
parameters using all available data even for cases with some
missing responses, whereas WLSMV considers all available data
for each pair of variables when estimating the sample statistics.
There are, therefore, fewer missing values for the factors than for
raw scores: 0% (conviction factor), 13.6% (JTC factor), and 14.7%
(belief flexibility factor).
Results
Demographic and Clinical Data
A total of 273 patients with delusions were included in this
study. Seventy percent (n  193) of the sample was male, and the
mean age was 37.7 years (range 19 to 65). The sample was drawn
from the following ethnic groups: White (72.2%), Black African
(9.2%), Black Caribbean (7.3%), Black other (2.2%), Indian
(1.8%), and other (7.3%). The major psychiatric diagnoses were
schizophrenia (85.0%), schizoaffective disorder (13.6%), and de-
lusional disorder (1.6%). They had an average length of illness of
10.78 years (SD  8.96, range 0–44 years). The mean scores for
the psychotic symptom measures at baseline and at the follow-ups
are shown in Table 1, and they indicate a moderately high level of
psychotic symptoms.
At baseline, 110 (41%) participants with delusions had 100%
conviction in their belief, 109 (40.7%) held the delusion with
conviction between 50 and 99%, and 49 (18.2%) participants
had less than 50% conviction in their delusion. The percentages
of the sample (n  273) rated 3 (moderate) or above on the
SAPS for each subtype of delusions were as follows: persecu-
tory delusions (57.5%), delusions of reference (55.6%), gran-
diose delusions (24.2%), delusions of mind reading (23.5%),
religious delusions (17.6%), somatic delusions (17.2%),
thought insertion (13.5%), delusions of being controlled
(12.9%), thought withdrawal (12.8%), thought broadcasting
(10.6%), delusions of guilt or sin (8.4%), and delusions of
jealousy (1.8%).
Reasoning biases were common. The percentages of participants
who jumped to conclusions on the 85:15 beads task at baseline, 3
months, and 12 months were 52.4% (n  98 out of 187), 61.8%
Table 1
Mean Scores (and SDs) of Psychotic Symptoms and Delusional
Conviction Measures at Each Time Point
Time
0 months 3 months 12 months
Psychotic symptoms
PANSS total n  273 n  229 n  221
66.64 (14.09) 60.60 (14.10) 59.72 (15.02)
PANSS positive n  273 n  229 n  221
18.81 (5.00) 16.44 (5.40) 16.24 (6.05)
SAPS total n  267 n  222 n  218
31.51 (16.48) 23.41 (17.13) 23.57 (18.24)
PSYRATS delusion n  270 n  228 n  220
14.32 (6.44) 11.00 (7.03) 10.20 (7.14)
Delusional conviction
PANSS delusion n  273 n  230 n  221
4.63 (1.43) 3.93 (1.57) 3.74 (1.55)
SAPS delusion n  273 n  229 n  221
3.44 (1.27) 2.72 (1.58) 2.72 (1.57)
PSYRATS conviction n  268 n  228 n  215
2.98 (1.26) 2.53 (1.52) 2.45 (1.58)
EoE conviction n  204 n  179 n  149
83.06 (21.96) 70.17 (34.41) 59.24 (38.92)
Note. PANSS  Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale; SAPS  Scale
for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms; PSYRATS  Psychotic Symp-
tom Rating Scale; EoE  Explanation of Experiences.
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The equivalent values for the 60:40 beads task were 40.2% (n 
74 out of 184), 44.4% (n  64 out of 144), and 41.2% (n  61 out
of 148), respectively. The percentages for the 60:40 words task
were 38.2% (n  68 out of 178), 43.6% (n  61 out of 140), and
41.9% (n  62 out of 148).
The percentages of participants who thought it was impossible
that they could be mistaken about their belief at baseline, 3
months, and 12 months were 49.5% (n  107 out of 216), 43.6%
(n  78 out of 179), and 42.6% (n  66 out of 155), respectively.
The percentages of participants who reacted negatively to the
hypothetical contradiction (i.e., not allowing a potential decrease
in conviction if the hypothetical event were to occur) at the three
time points were: 67.3% (n  138 out of 205), 56.3% (n  94 out
of 167) and 46.2% (n  66 out of 143). The percentages of
individuals who did not give alternative explanations for their
belief were 76.1% (n  156 out of 205), 73.9% (n  133 out of
180) and 70.7% (n  106 out of 150).
The relationships between the individual measures at baseline
are shown in Table 2. It can be seen that the measures of convic-
tion are all highly significantly correlated with each other al-
though, unsurprisingly, the conviction rating from the EoE assess-
ment has a relatively weaker relationship with the PANSS and the
SAPS measures. There is no evidence of a relationship between the
individual indicators of conviction with JTC measures, while there
is evidence that higher conviction is associated with less belief
flexibility. It can also be seen that the individual indicators of JTC
are all highly significantly related to each other, as are those of
belief flexibility; however, it is clear that the relationships between
the individual measures of JTC with measures of belief flexibility
are generally not significantly related, with the exception of sig-
nificant relationships between two of the indicators of JTC with
RTHC.
Hypothesis 1: Delusional Conviction, JTC and Belief
Flexibility Are Distinct but Interrelated Processes
Exploratory factor analysis was performed on the four measures
of conviction, the three measures of JTC, and the three measures
of belief flexibility. (For JTC, we initially performed the EFA
using both our preferred dichotomous method of scoring (JTC: 2
beads or fewer; no JTC: over 2 beads) and a continuous measure
(number of beads drawn), but found that the dichotomous scoring
method resulted in a better chi-square test of model fit. We have,
therefore, used the factors from the dichotomous scoring of JTC in
all the following analyses.) As shown in Table 3, a three-factor
model fitted the data best. Moreover, the factor loadings shown in
Table 4 indicate that the three factors clearly represent delusional
conviction, JTC, and belief flexibility, respectively.
For the conviction factor, since the PSYRATS and EoE items
are specific measures of delusional conviction but the PANSS
delusion item and the SAPS global delusion score are measures
that combine several dimensions of delusional experience along
with conviction, the residuals of the last two items were set to be
correlated in the factor model, so that the resultant factor reflected
level of delusional conviction. The model fit indices showed that
the conviction factor model with correlated residuals was a better
fit than the model without the correlations (see Table 5). Confir-
matory factor analysis was then performed on the baseline con-
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134 SO ET AL.viction and reasoning bias variables. Figure 1 shows the new
structure of the three factors with standardized estimates of factor
loadings and correlations between factors.
Based on the structure of the three factors, factor scores across
time points were estimated using longitudinal factor analysis mod-
els for each of the three concepts separately. The mean factor
scores for each factor at the three time points were as follows: (a)
Conviction (n  273), 4.64, SD  1.10; 3.91, SD  1.21; 3.73,
SD  1.18; (b) JTC (n  236), 0.17, SD  1.04; 0.61, SD  1.03;
0.29, SD  1.28; and (c) belief flexibility (n  233), 0.08, SD 
1.70; 0.40, SD  1.55; 0.60, SD  2.04. Correlations between the
estimated factor scores at each time point are shown in Table 6.
There are very strong correlations within the JTC and belief
flexibility factors across time points, consistent with their being
stable over time, whereas the correlations within the conviction
factor over time, while significant, are lower, indicating less sta-
bility (see below). Conviction factor scores are correlated with
belief flexibility factor scores at all time points (i.e., greater con-
viction is associated with less belief flexibility), but not with JTC
factor scores at any time point. There is a weak correlation be-
tween belief flexibility factor score at baseline and JTC factor
scores at baseline and 12 months (i.e., greater JTC bias is associ-
ated with less belief flexibility; see Table 6).
Hypothesis 2: Conviction and a Lack of Belief
Flexibility Will Decline Over Time, Whereas JTC Is
Relatively Stable
Changes in factor scores over time were analyzed by creating
two contrast parameters in the longitudinal factor analysis models:
(1) the contrast between factor means at 3 months and 12 months;
and (2) the contrast between baseline factor mean and the average
of 3 months and 12 months. Tests of contrasts showed that there
was no significant change in the conviction factor score between 3
and 12 months, mean change 0.19, SE 0.12, p  .12, but that there
was a highly significant change between baseline and the average
of the two follow-up values, mean change 0.81, SE 0.10, p  .01.
In this case, the equality constraints for the factor loadings over
time were not supported by the data. This had practically no effect
on the conclusions, however: mean factor change between 3 and
12 months 0.19, SE 0.12, p  .12, and the mean change between
baseline and the average of 3 and 12 months 0.81, SE 0.10, p 
.01. However, note that although the model with time-varying
factor loadings fitted reasonably well according to the CFI (0.97)
and RMSEA (0.08) criteria, the fit was not good according to the
chi-square value (135.73 with 48 degrees of freedom). On the
PSYRATS, 38.4% of the sample showed a decrease in delusional
conviction, 42.7% showed no change, and 18.9% showed an
increase over the year of follow-up. A third (34.4%, n  31) of the
participants maintained 100% conviction in their beliefs through-
out the 12 months.
Tests of contrasts showed no significant change in the JTC
factor score between 3 and 12 months, mean change 0.33, SE 0.24,
p  .17, or between baseline and average of the 3 and 12 months
values, mean change 0.29, SE 0.20, p  .16, with the chi-square
test for the equality of factor scores at the three times being 3.91
with 2 degrees of freedom, p  .05. The fit of the model with
time-invariant factor loading was very good, indicated by a CFI of
1, an RMSEA of 0, and a chi-square of 20.90 with 28 degrees of
freedom.
Likewise, there was no significant change in belief flexibility
factor scores between 3 and 12 months, mean change 0.21, SE
0.37, p  .58, or between baseline and the average of 3 and 12
months, mean change 0.49, SE 0.30, p  .10. The chi-square for
constraining for the factor scores to be the same for all three time
points was 3.22 with 2 degrees of freedom, p  .05. The fit of the
model with time-invariant factor loading was good as indicated by
a CFI of 0.98 and an RMSEA of 0.06, but some lack of fit
suggested by a chi-square of 40.81 with 24 degrees of freedom.
In summary, there was some evidence of an overall decline in
delusional conviction but none in either JTC or belief flexibility.
Hypothesis 3: Baseline JTC and Lack of Belief
Flexibility Predict Persistence in Conviction Over
Time
As shown in Table 6, the baseline JTC factor score did not
significantly correlate with the conviction factor score at any time
point, p  .65 [baseline], .41 [3 month], .28 [12 month]. In
contrast, the baseline belief flexibility factor score correlated neg-
Table 3
Comparison of 1-, 2-, and 3-Factor Models
Model fit indices 1-factor model 2-factor model 3 factor model
x
2 goodness of fit 778.25 (p  .01) 138.11 (p  .01) 28.24 (p  .06)
Comparative fit index (CFI) 0.50 0.92 0.99
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 0.28 0.13 0.05
Table 4
Exploratory Factor Analysis of Baseline Measures of
Conviction, JTC and BF—Geomin Rotated Factor Loadings
Baseline measures Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
PANSS P1 item 0.91 0.10 0.01
SAPS global delusion item 0.92 0.00 0.16
PSYRATS conviction 0.70 0.01 0.23
EoE conviction 0.72 0.02 0.29
JTC on 8515 beads 0.02 0.76 0.01
JTC on 6040 beads 0.01 0.96 0.15
JTC on words 0.03 0.91 0.01
PM 0.30 0.00 1.41
RTHC 0.05 0.32 0.60
Generation of alternative explanations 0.01 0.10 0.53
Note. Factor loadings 0.4 are in boldface. PANSS  Positive and
Negative Syndrome Scale; SAPS  Scale for the Assessment of Positive
Symptoms; PSYRATS  Psychotic Symptom Rating Scale; EoE  Ex-
planation of Experiences; JTC  Jumping To Conclusions; PM  Possi-
bility of Being Mistaken; RTHC  Reaction To Hypothetical Contradic-
tion.
135 REASONING BIASIS AND DELUSIONAL CONVICTIONatively with conviction factor scores at all time points, p.01 at all
time points; that is, individuals with inflexible beliefs at baseline
had higher levels of conviction at all time points.
Calculation of Pearson correlations indicated that changes in the
factor scores for conviction were not significantly correlated with
baseline values of the JTC factor, r  .03 (p  .65) and r  .04
(p  .56), for the changes between 0 and 3 months and between
0 and 12 months, respectively, or the belief flexibility factor for the
change between 0 and 12 months, r  0.04 (p  .52), though the
correlation between baseline belief flexibility and change in con-
viction in the first three months was marginally significant, r 
0.13 (p  .06).
Discussion
Cognitive models of delusions have placed an emphasis on
reasoning processes, and this is the largest study so far on this
topic. Almost 300 people with delusions were repeatedly assessed
Conviction
PANSS P1 item
EoE Conviction
PSYRATS Conviction
SAPS global delusion
0.80
0.64
0.96
0.98
0.60
Words 60:40
Beads 60:40  
Beads 85:15   
0.76
0.93
0.93
Generation of alternative explanations
Reaction to hypothetical contradiction
Possibility of being mistaken
1.08
0.77
0.59
    JTC
Belief 
flexibility
-0.04
-0.23
-0.63
Figure 1. Final factor structure and loadings (standardized estimates) of conviction, JTC, and belief flexibility
following confirmatory factor analysis.
Table 5
Comparison of Measurement Models On Baseline Conviction
Model fit indices Model without correlation Model with correlation
x
2 goodness of fit 90.55 (p.01) 1.71 (p.19)
Comparative fit index (CFI) 0.90 1.00
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 0.40 0.05
136 SO ET AL.on multiple measures of delusion conviction, JTC, and belief
flexibility. The sample was of patients who had had at least two
acute episodes, and these individuals typically had a lengthy his-
tory of psychotic symptoms. If, as cognitive models assert, delu-
sions are maintained by biased reasoning, such biases should be
especially apparent. This was confirmed. At the first assessment,
50% of participants showed JTC on the standard beads task, while
a similar proportion thought they could not be mistaken in their
belief. These proportions are consistent with the smaller studies
reported previously.
While previous studies have reported correlations between de-
lusional conviction and reasoning biases, this is the first time that
multiple measures have been put together to examine their factor
structure. Three distinct factors of conviction, JTC, and belief
flexibility emerged, suggesting that the measures used here, along
with many of the different measures reported previously, are
tapping distinct and coherent constructs. Method variance may
have played some part in these results and possibly inflated the
effects: Two of the constructs were assessed by binary variables
and one by quantitative scoring, and JTC was assessed by a
delusion-unrelated cognitive task rather than by delusion-focused
interview. Whether other methods would so clearly replicate these
three constructs is an empirical question. Another limitation was
the amount of missing data. Clearly, a more complete data set
would have been preferable, and replication of the results is
necessary, but the way in which factor analysis models make
allowance for missing data is a strength of this statistical method.
We have also clarified the relationship between these constructs.
The inability to think that the delusion could be at all incorrect and
to generate alternative explanations for events is distinct from high
levels of belief conviction. Belief flexibility is, therefore, not
merely a refined method of assessing delusional conviction. Belief
flexibility was, nevertheless, associated at all time points with the
degree of delusional conviction, and especially highly negatively
correlated at baseline, consistent with our earlier report (Garety et
al., 2005). Conviction and belief inflexibility, at least when as-
sessed directly with regards to the delusions, are understandably
linked and share common variance. How, then, are they different?
We can illustrate the point by considering the proportion of the 110
people in our sample with 100% conviction at baseline who
affirmed that they may or may not be mistaken on the PM measure.
Approximately one quarter (23%) with 100% conviction scored
positively on PM, “I am fully convinced but can concede that I
may be mistaken”; this differs from “I am fully convinced, and it
is impossible that I am mistaken,” which was found in the remain-
ing 77%. People can be equally convinced that they are correct in
asserting a given belief but differ in their relationship to that
conviction.
Contrary to our previous report, we did not find that JTC was
associated with a higher level of delusional conviction (Garety et
al., 2005). This may be because JTC is simply only one of many
processes contributing to delusional conviction over time. JTC is
clearly related to the presence of delusions, but these data suggest
that levels of conviction may be more closely related to and
possibly influenced by the relatively independent processes of
belief flexibility. The main finding in relation to JTC is that, in a
large group prone to enduring high conviction beliefs, there were
significant levels of JTC. There were also indications of modest
relationships between belief flexibility and JTC, as was expected.
All members of the study group had experienced a recent
relapse of psychosis, and it is striking that the delusions and
reasoning biases were so persistent over the period of follow-up.
Although conviction was less stable in that there was a significant
decrease in the conviction factor score in the first 3 months, the
decrease was small, and substantial levels of symptoms remained.
Despite receiving treatment, one third of the group held their
delusions with 100% certainty throughout the year of assessment,
and only about one third of participants showed a decrease in
delusional conviction. Moreover, there were no significant
changes in both the reasoning biases. Reasoning biases and con-
viction were, thus, hardly affected by a year’s treatment with
medication and, for some in this study, psychological therapy. No
previous studies have reported on the stability of belief flexibility,
while our findings concerning the stability of JTC are consistent
with other reports (e.g., Peters & Garety, 2006). It is noteworthy
here that both JTC and belief flexibility are stable, whereas con-
viction may change—an inflexible way of thinking or limited data
gathering do not improve as the delusional conviction reduces;
Table 6
Correlation Between Factor Scores at Each Time Point
Conviction Jumping to conclusions Belief flexibility
Baseline
3
months
12
months Baseline
3
months
12
months Baseline
3
months
12
months
Conviction
Baseline
3 months .53

12 months .31
 .55

Jumping to conclusions
Baseline .03 .05 .07
3 months .09 .07 .04 .88

12 months .10 .05 .07 .84
 .93

Belief flexibility
Baseline .40
 .40
 .30
 .14
 .12 .14

3 months .34
 .51
 .33
 .11 .11 .13 .87

12 months .29
 .43
 .47
 .11 .10 .12 .79
 .86

 p  .05.
 p  .01.
137 REASONING BIASIS AND DELUSIONAL CONVICTIONrather, they are enduring. There is, however, some weak evidence,
that belief flexibility predicts conviction change in that there was
a marginally significant association between baseline belief flex-
ibility and change in conviction at 3 months, consistent with earlier
research findings (e.g., Garety et al., 1997). Flexible thinking may
render the person more open to experiences or ideas which change
their conclusions. However, a limitation of this study is that what
could be learned about the relationships between changes in delu-
sional conviction, belief flexibility, and jumping to conclusions
was unexpectedly severely curtailed by the relative stability of the
variables of interest.
How can this work be taken forward? There are two clear routes.
One is to carry out a similar observational study in patients more
likely to show change over time, for instance, in individuals with
at-risk mental states, patients in early contact with services, or
patients entering a prodromal phase. It would be of interest to
assess JTC and belief flexibility for delusion-related and neutral
materials and to address the limitations of method variance noted
above. Assessment of metacognitive beliefs about decision-
making and executive functioning abilities to learn about the
cognitive factors related to reasoning biases would also be of
interest. The second route is more clinically relevant, and that is to
alter reasoning biases using precisely targeted interventions and
examine the effects on delusional beliefs. That is, to take a ma-
nipulationist or interventionist causal model approach (Kendler &
Campbell, 2009), thereby potentially providing stronger causal
evidence for a role of reasoning biases in delusion maintenance.
Reasoning biases are clearly evident in the sample, and even for
those not showing the extreme forms, it is likely that if more
careful data-gathering and consideration of alternative explana-
tions could be encouraged, then this may help produce a shift from
a delusional perspective. The study indicates that increasing data-
gathering may be one of several potential techniques that will
assist in enabling greater belief flexibility, which is the reasoning
process most closely tied to degree of belief in the delusional idea.
Potentially appropriate techniques are currently being developed
(e.g., Ross et al., 2009; Moritz, Vitzthum, Randjbar, Veckenstedt,
& Woodward, 2010; Waller, Freeman, Jolley, Dunn, & Garety,
2011).
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